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PROTECTIVE ORDERS RESTRICTING DISCLOSURE OF
DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, formulated by the United
2
States Supreme Court in 1937,' permit a liberal discovery process.
The problem of abusive, oppressive, or burdensome discovery 3 necessitated a mechanism by which a party could restrict such discovery. In
response to the problem, the Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c) which allows any person against whom discovery
is sought to obtain a protective order, upon a showing of good cause, to
protect against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. 4 Rule 26(c) provides for many different types of restrictions to control abusive discovery,5 one of which is a limitation on
I. In 1937, the United States Supreme Court formulated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to congressional authorization. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Congress may scrutinize,
and, where appropriate, veto the judicially formulated rules during a mandatory ninety-day "layover period" between the time they are reported by the Chief Justice and their effective date. 1d.
2. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26-31, 33-36.
3. See 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 26.69-26.78 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as
MOORE]; Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate PretrialDiscovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958);
Note, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the FederalRules, 59 YALE L.J. 117 (1949)
[hereinafter referred to as Tactical Use and Abuse].
4. Rule 26(c), the substance of which was originally enacted in 1937 as rule 30(b), provides:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is
to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time of place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with
no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only
in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on
such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or.permit
discovery....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Prior to reorganization of the discovery rules in 1970, protective orders were obtained under
rule 30(b), which also provided for taking depositions by oral examination. Rule 30(b) was made
applicable to the other discovery procedures, such as written depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents, by cross-reference. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 26.01 [20].
In 1970, the language of 30(b) was changed to that in rule 26(c) to broaden the application of
protective orders to discovery in general. 28 U.S.C. app. Rule 26, Notes of Advisory Committee
on 1970 Amendment to Rule 26 (1976).
5. See text accompanying notes 29-34, 44-48 infra.
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the extrajudicial disclosure of information received through discovery.
This restriction is often sought to protect a party's secrets from being
publicized.
To obtain a protective order under rule 26(c) to restrict disclosure
of discovered information, an applicant must satisfy the rule's "good
cause" requirement 6 by showing sufficient reason for granting the order. 7 The courts in general have struggled over the degree of harm a
party must show to meet the good cause requirement. Applying the
good cause requirement to orders restricting disclosure of discovered
information has caused the courts particular confusion because of the
first amendment interests involved in any ban on disclosure. Some
courts have held that the similarity between such orders and prior restraints on freedom of speech mandates an application of the strict first
amendment standard used to judge prior restraints.8 Until recently,
whenever courts have applied the strict constitutional standard to orders restricting disclosure of discovery, the requested limitation has
been denied.9
Civil libertarians will be relieved by recent decisions which deny
orders restricting disclosure of discovery on the basis of first amendment interests. Others, perhaps possessing a more practical perspective
on litigation, see such decisions as creating a new tool in litigation strategy: An aggressive attorney, protected by the first amendment guarantee of free speech, could use an implied threat of disclosure of
information obtained in discovery for leverage in the pending litigation. 0
This note will discuss protective orders restricting the disclosure of
information obtained through discovery in federal civil proceedings.
The note will analyze rule 26(c)'s provision for protective orders, with
focus on the good cause requirement. Cases involving restrictions on
disclosure of trade secrets will be discussed. The constitutionality of
restrictions on disclosure of discovery then will be examined by focusing on the recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, In re Halkin.I
6. See text accompanying notes 19-25 infra.
7. Id.
8. See text accompanying notes 167-88 infra.
9. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp.
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). However, the protective orders in both of these cases did not seek to prohibit
disclosure of trade secrets which traditionally have enjoyed substantial protection. See text accompanying notes 83-95 infra. But see Brink v. Dalesio, 82 F.R.D. 664 (D. Md. 1979).
10. See Tactical Use and.Abuse, supra note 3, at 136, 138.
1I. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER RULE

26(c)

The somewhat limited discovery process of the nineteenth century finally blossomed into a very liberal and open inquiry when, in
1937, the United States Supreme Court enacted rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides for discovery of "any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action."1 3 However, these broad discovery rules do not entitle
a party to an unlimited inquiry. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)
allows a party, by motion, to obtain "any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" in discovery.' 4 In so doing, the rule
leaves it to the discretion of the court' 5 to decide what restrictions on an
otherwise broad and liberal discovery process' 6 may be necessary in a
12

12. These limitations were: (1) discovery only of facts which pertained to the discoverer's
case, not evidence adversary had collected against discoverer, 6 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1846,
1856(b)&(c) (Chadbourn rev. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as WIGMORE]; (2) discovery only of
facts otherwise unavailable to the discoverer, Hubert v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.,
90 Conn. 261, 96 A. 967 (1916); most courts, however, allowed discovery of facts helpful to the
discoverer's case, Green v. Selznick, 220 App. Div. 12, 221 N.Y. Supp. 63 (1927); Albanos v. New
Syndicate Co., 130 Misc. 566, 224 N.Y. Supp. 331 (1927); (3) discovery only of facts admissible in
evidence at trial, Missouri v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645 (1946); (4) discovery only
against the adverse party, WIGMORE supra at §§ 1856(a)&(d).
Many states in the 1800's enacted statutes to confer upon the common law courts the power to
compel discovery; but, again, these powers were extensively limited. See PUB. STAT. LAWS OF
CONN. ch. 3, § I at 4 (1836-37); VA. LAWS ch. XI, § 68 (1830-31). For a general discussion, see R.
MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 204-06 (1952).
Despite their limitations, these statutes marked'a change in attitude toward discovery. Pretrial
discovery increasingly was viewed as a valuable tool in information gathering over and above the
mere need for trial evidence not otherwise available. Expressing this view, the framers of the 1848
New York Code of Procedure found discovery to be "in harmony with the whole spirit of [their]
design; which is, to get at the facts in a legal controversy by the shortest possible way .. " N.Y.
CODE OF PROCEDURE, First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings 241 (1848).
See also G. RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, 16-18, 25, 26 (1932).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Such a definition is extremely broad in scope and implements a very
liberal discovery process. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Justice Murphy, in Hickman,
clearly delineated the Court's attitude toward its enactment of a liberal discovery process: "Thus
civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear,
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before trial." Id. at 501. The United States Supreme Court's purpose in formulating such a liberal discovery policy was to produce a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action. See United States v. Continental Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1962); National
Bondholders Co. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1938). Liberal discovery accomplishes this
objective by narrowing and clarifying the basic issues between the parties and by ascertaining the
facts relative to those issues. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Formerly rule 30(b), the rule was changed to 26(c) in 1970. See
note 4 supra.
15. Justice Murphy, in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), emphasized the broad scope
of these orders when he said that "limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass or oppress the person subject to the inquiry." Id. at 507-08.
16. See note 13 supra.
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particular case. 17 The justification for giving the court such broad
power to limit discovery derives from the traditional notion of the in8
herent powers of the court over its own process.'
Rule 26(c)'s requirement that a party seeking a protective order
must show good cause determines the extent to which a protective order may restrict discovery.' 9 The burden is on the moving party to
20
show good cause, that is, some plainly adequate reason for the order.
The courts have insisted on specific showings of fact, rather than conclusory statements, to establish good cause. 2 ' A court must have before
it enough information to assess the nature and magnitude of the moving party's interests. 22 The degree of specificity with which this information must be presented depends in each case upon the kind of
protective order sought. 23 The court will then balance the moving
party's interests in restricting the discovery against the non-moving
party's need for discovery 24 to determine whether and what type of lim25
its on discovery should be imposed.
17. See, e.g., Chemical & Indus. Co. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Brussell Sewing Mach. Co., 3 F.R.D. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
18. In Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884), the United States Supreme Court noted
that "the equitable powers of courts of law over their own process to prevent abuse, oppression
...
Id. at 283. See also Buck v.
and injustice are inherent and equally extensive and efficient.
Colbath, 70 U.S. 334 (1865).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See also United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338, 341 (W.D.
Mo. 1962); Velasquez v. South At. S.S. Line, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
20. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975); Kiblen v. Retail Credit Co., 76
F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Wash. 1977); United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 186, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
21. See, e.g., White v. Wirtz, 402 F.2d 145 (10th Cir: 1968); Apco Oil Co. v. Certified Transp.,
Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
22. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
23. Compare Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975), where the court
required a strong showing of good cause before a party can be denied entirely the right to take a
deposition with Paul v. Sinnott, 217 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Pa. 1963), where the court granted a protective order in a patent infringement action to restrict disclosure of trade secrets although defendant had not substantiated its allegations as to the existence of the trade secrets; see also MOORE,
26.68-26.78.
supra note 3, at
24. In evaluating the need for discovery in the litigation at hand, a court will look to whether
the information is relevant to the discover's case. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1960). Relevancy is defined as the likelihood that useful evidence may be found. Id. at
659. A court will also look to how crucial the information is to his case. Cf Royal Exchange
Assurance v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (the court stated that the necessity of
the discovery for the preparation of the case is a factor to determine whether good cause exists for
plaintiffs inspection).
A court may also look to whether the information is otherwise available, although availability
of information alone will not justify the granting of a protective order. Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 998 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965).
25. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,380
U.S. 964 (1965); Hyam v. American Export Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1954); United States
v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y.), appealdismissed,371 U.S. 207, cert. denied, 371 U.S.
932 (1961).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Besides granting general power to the courts to remedy abusive
discovery, rule 26(c) sets out eight specific restrictions which may be
imposed through protective orders. 26 These eight restrictions represent
the customary limits imposed on an abusive inquiry. They can be divided into two categories: restrictions on the initial receipt of information through discovery 27 and restrictions on the disclosure of
information once it is received through discovery. 2 8 The first category
of restrictions provides for the prohibition of discovery altogether, 2 9 as
30
well as for limitations on the time, place, and manner of discovery.
These restrictions may also be used to limit the quantity and quality of
the discovery. 3' The second category of restrictions provides for the
private discovery of secret information, 32 the sealing of discovered information to be opened only by the court, 33 and limitations on disclo34
sure of trade secrets.
The bifurcation of rule 26(c)'s restrictions arises from a reading of
the cases deciding on the 26(c) restrictions as well as from a reading of
rule 26(c) itself.3 5 Restrictions on the receipt of information have been
used to prevent harm that may result directly from the discovery process. 36 For example, if too many interrogatories are propounded, or if
an unreasonably long deposition is requested, a restriction of the first

26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)-(c)(8). A party seeking a protective order would usually request
one of these eight specific restrictions. Nevertheless, if a party seeks a limitation not found in any
of the eight provisions, he may seek any order "which justice requires" under rule 26(c)'s general
grant of power. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 26.78.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(l)-(c)(4).
28. Id. 26(c)(5)-(c)(8).
29. Id. 26(c)(1). See, e.g., Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Associated
Metals & Minerals Corp. v. S.S. Geert Howaldt, 348 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1965).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2), (c)(3). See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Boylan, 33 F. Supp. 657
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (time); Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-Wide Auto. Corp., 26
F.R.D. 592 (D.N.J. 1960) (place); Fishman v. A.H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704 (D.V.I.
1975) (manner).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4). See, e.g., Herron v. Blackford, 264 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1959)
(quantity); Williams v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 343 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (quality).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5).
33. Id. 26(c)(6), (c)(8).
34. Id. 26(c)(7).
35. For cases involving 26(c) restrictions (1)-(4), see notes 29-31 supra. For cases involving
26(c) restrictions (5)-(8), see text and accompanying notes 99-110 infra.
36. See, e.g., DeDalmady v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 62 F.R.D. 157 (D.P.R. 1973) (plaintiff
was granted an order to hold a deposition in Venezuela, his residence, due to the financial hardships that would be imposed upon him if the deposition were held in Puerto Rico); Global Maritime Leasing, Inc. v. M/S North Breeze Navigation Co., 451 F. Supp. 965 (D.R.I. 1978) (an order
preventing discovery was granted because the discovery, which was sought eight years after commencement of the action, required considerable time, effort, and cost to produce); In re United
States Financial Securities Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (the court prohibited discovery because interrogatories would cost approximately $24,000 to answer).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

category is sought to prevent the burdensome discovery mechanism. 37
Restrictions on the disclosure of information have been used to prevent
harm that would result from the dissemination of the discovered information. 38 Thus, if interrogatories ask for secret information, a restriction of the second category would normally be sought to prevent
39
disclosure of the information.
The division of rule 26(c)'s eight restrictions into two distinct categories is not absolute. Litigants who attempt to prevent disclosure of
trade secrets may seek a protective order to restrict discovery altogether.4° Courts, however, are reluctant to grant such restrictions 4' and
generally prefer to rely on restrictions which prevent the disclosure of
secret information obtained through discovery. 42 Nevertheless, the distinction between the two categories of restrictions is important because
rule 26(c)'s good cause standard differs when it is applied to each respective category. 4 3
Restrictions on DisclosingInformation Received Through Discovery
Rule 26(c) specifically provides for four separate types of protective orders which restrict the disclosure of discovered information. 44 A
court may order "that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court, 45 that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court,4 6 that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development or commercial information
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way, 47 and that the
parties simultaneously file specific documents or information enclosed
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. '48 These
37. See, e.g., Banana Dist. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
38. See text accompanying notes 44-76 infra.
39. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
40. Everco Indus., Inc. v. O.E.M. Prod. Co., 362 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. IlI. 1973).
41. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 26.69. See also Haviland & Co. v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 31 F.R.D. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
42. See Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1968); Carter Prods., Inc. v. Eversharp, 360
F.2d 868, 872-73 (7th Cir. 1966).
43. See text accompanying notes 56-76 infra.
44. It is evident from the language of these provisions that the Supreme Court intended their
use specifically for restricting the disclosure of information received through discovery. The
courts have similarly construed the language of these provisions. See text accompanying notes 3539 supra. However, they by no means present the only provisions by which the disclosure of
information received through discovery may be restricted. See text accompanying notes 40-42
supra.

45.
46.
47.
48.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5).
Id. 26(c)(6).
Id. 26(c)(7).
Id. 26(c)(8).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

provisions allow the party against whom discovery is sought to restrict
in some way the disclosure of discovered information despite the gen-

eral rule that pretrial proceedings in the federal judicial system are con-

49
ducted in public and become part of the public record.
The scope of possible restrictions on disclosure of discovered information is wide. Restrictions on the dissemination of deposition
transcripts have been allowed, 0 as well as restrictions on the disclosure
of the information revealed at the depositions.5 1 At times, restrictions
imposed have been so broad as to limit disclosure of discovery solely to
the discoverer's counsel, researchers, and consultants 52 for use in the
53
litigation at hand.

Rule 26(c) requires that the party seeking a protective order which
restricts the disclosure of discovered information show good cause why
the information should not be made public.54 In practice, rule 26(c)'s
required showing of good cause by a party seeking to restrict the disclosure of discovered information differs slightly from the good cause
showing necessary to obtain an order restricting discovery initially. In-

deed, requests for both types of restrictions are judged by a balancing

test, 55 where the harm to the discoveree is weighed against the need for
either the discovery or the disclosure of the discovered material. Yet, a
stricter standard is used to evaluate restrictions on disclosure of discovery material, 56 due in part to the difficulty in assessing any harm which
49. Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Romney, 55
F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (purpose of the
federal rules is to force full and open disclosure). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (in all trials, the
testimony will be taken in open court).
Many states, either by statute or by constitution, guarantee public trials for civil litigants.
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; CAL. Civ. CODE § 124 (West 1979); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1978); OR. CONST. art. 1, § 10; OR. REV. STAT. § 1.040 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.14
(West 1971).
50. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); International Prods.
Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. International Prods. Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
52. Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Metal Foil Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 55 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Va. 1970); National
Utility Serv., Inc. v. Wisconsin Centrifugal Foundry, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 30 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
53. Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However, two
cases reveal discontent with such a restriction. In Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D.
405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), the court denied a restriction sought to limit use of discovery to the litigation
at hand when parties involved agreed to keep sensitive information secret. In Williams v. Johnson
& Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court refused to limit the use of discovery when the
movant failed to show that discoverer's attorneys were using the information to stir up litigation or
to create improper publicity.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See, e.g., United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
55. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
56. See Consolidated Box Co. v. United States, 18 F.R. Serv. 2d 115 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Seealso
text and accompanying notes 59-76 infra.
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may result,57 and in part to the first amendment interests involved. 58
Thus, a party is required to show more compelling reasons for the issuance of an order to restrict disclosure of information obtained through
discovery than to restrict discovery itself.5 9
The harm to the discoveree, one side of the balancing test used by
courts when applying rule 26(c)'s good cause standard, is harder to assess when the harm is due to unrestricted disclosure of discovery material. Any harm to the discoveree from discovery itself usually stems
from the particular type of discovery sought. 60 The harm can be easily
and accurately evaluated by the court because it is purely a function of
6
the interaction between the discoveree and the discovery process. '
Thus, the court can question the discoveree to learn exactly how and
why the particular discovery process will harm him. However, evaluation of the harm from disclosure of discovery requires speculation as to
the danger that might result from the publication of the information
obtained. This is a very difficult risk to predict, 62 as compared to the
more ascertainable harm resulting from the discovery process; harm
from disclosure depends on the reactions of those receiving the information. To assess most accurately the harm from disclosure of secret
information, the court theoretically would have to question all possible
57. See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 112-19 and 167-88 infra.
59. Compare the good cause standard used in Apco Oil Co. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46
F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969), a case which involved a restriction on discovery itself, with Williams
v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a case which involved a restriction on the
disclosure of discovery. In Apco, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri denied plaintiffs request to restrict defendants' attempt to impose on plaintiff the task of
examining a large number of documents, extracting the requested information therefrom, and
compiling the information on the form requested by defendants' interrogatories. However, the
court held that a restriction on the interrogatories could be imposed if the defendants in fact
already possessed the evidence which would yield the answers to the interrogatories. 46 F.R.D. at
431. In Williams, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
defendants' attempt to prohibit plaintiffs or their attorneys from disclosing any material obtained
from defendants through discovery. The court held that, absent a showing that plaintiffs' attorneys were using the discovered information in bad faith, e.g., to stir up litigation or to create
improper publicity, no restriction on plaintiffs or on their attorneys would issue. 50 F.R.D. at 33.
This bad faith requirement implies a stricter good cause standard for restrictions on disclosure of
discovery. See also Maritime Cinema Serv. Co. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Williams v. Johnson &
Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y 1970); Leonia Amusement Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
But see Stanley Works v. Haeger Potteries, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 551, 555 (N.D. I11.1964), where
the court granted an order preventing discovery on the basis that trade secrets were sought, not on
the claim that the multitude of interrogatories would be burdensome.
60. See text and accompanying note 36 supra.
61. Id.
62. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 193 F. Supp. 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

recipients of the information about their expected reactions to such information. Of course, such an inquiry is impossible. Thus, to assist in
evaluating the potential harm to the discoveree when the discoverer
seeks to disclose discovered information, the courts have divided their
analysis of this harm into two parts: the probability of the harm occurring 6 3 and the seriousness of the harm. 64
In one case analyzing the probability of the harm occurring, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York6 5
denied a protective order sought by the United States to prevent the
defendant from obtaining sensitive business information which had
been received in confidence by the Government from non-party manufacturers. The court denied the motion for the order on the ground that
the proposed harm to the manufacturers, who were competitors of defendant, was too unlikely and too minimal. 66 Due to a lack of specific
facts, the court rejected the manufacturers' allegations of competitive
disadvantage 67 as unsubstantiated and noted that "[any prejudice or
harm to be occasioned by the companies answering the questionnaire
' '68
seems more theoretical than practical.
In another case which analyzed the seriousness of the harm, the
69
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
required the showing of a "serious and clearly defined injury ' 70 before
granting an order prohibiting disclosure of discovery material. Again,
the United States had received sensitive business information from defendant's competitors. When the defendant sought to discover this information, the competitors moved for a protective order. The court
denied the motion because of the competitors' failure to show seriousness or likelihood of injury. 7' The court reasoned that since the data
would be introduced at trial where defendant would have an opportu63. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
64. See United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
65. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
66. Id. at 250.
67. Although the motion for the order was made by the United States, each non-party manufacturer had an opportunity to voice its objection. Only two such companies objected. ld.
68. Id. See also Apco Oil Co. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969),
where the court said: "It is not necessary to add that the burden of proof will rest upon plaintiff
• . . and that the determination of whether good cause does or does not exist must be based upon
appropriate testimony and other factual data, not the unsupported contentions and conclusions of
counsel." Id. at 432. In Sacks v. Frank H. Lee Co., 18 F.R.D. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the district
court held that an attorney's affidavit that discovery will reveal secret formulas and trade secrets
was insufficient as proof to warrant a protective order. Accord, Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
69. United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
70. Id. at 257.
71. Id.
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nity to examine it then, there could be no additional harm to the competitors if the defendant obtained the information at the pretrial
stage. 72 The court therefore concluded the harm from pretrial disclosure was not serious enough to warrant a prohibition on the discov73
ery.
The need for disclosure, which weighs against the harm to the discoveree in the good cause balancing test, is actually the need of two
parties. A federal court weighs both the need of the discoverer to disclose and the need of the public to ascertain all relevant facts against
the harm which may be caused to the discoveree. 74 The discoverer's
need to disclose weighs heavily in the balancing test due to his first
amendment right to unrestricted speech. 75 The first amendment is also
designed to protect the public's access to free speech. 76 Thus, obtaining
an order restricting disclosure of discovery material is more difficult
than obtaining an order restricting discovery itself not only because of
the difficulty in assessing the possible harm from restrictions on disclosure but also because of the first amendment interests involved.
Restrictions on Disclosure of Discovered Trade Secrets
The type of information most often sought to be restricted by rule
26(c) is trade secrets. The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as
"information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know
72. Id. at 258. The court also noted that the information sought was not current, nor did it
involve secret processes or customer lists which have traditionally enjoyed greater protection than
most information. Id. at 257. See also American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co.,
23 F.R.D. 680 (D.R.I. 1959).
73. 193 F. Supp. at 258. It should be noted, however, that the court did restrict the disclosure
of the information to the litigants for their use in the case. Id.
74. Consolidated Box Co. v. United States, 18 F.R. Serv. 2d 115 (Ct. Cl. 1973). The court in
Consolidated Box stated that in ruling on a motion for a protective order against discovery of
confidential information, "a federal court weighs the needs of the party seeking discovery and the
public interest in ascertainmentofall the relevantfacts, on the one hand, against the harm which
may be caused to the third person by disclosure of the confidential information." Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
75. See text accompanying notes 115-19 and 167-88 infra. Restrictions on discovery itself
lack the first amendment interests bound up in restrictions on disclosure, because parties do not
have a right of access to information not generally available to the public. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d

176, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609- 10
(1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). One
court has explained that "[a] prohibition on what plaintiffs may say about information once they
have obtained it, however, directly implicates the First Amendment." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176,
190 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-38

(1978).
76. See generally Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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''7 7 The need for restrictions on disclosure of this type of inforor use it.
mation is reflected in a subsection of rule 26(c) which provides that a
court may order "that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed
only in a designated way. '' 78 Although there have been attempts to
restrict the disclosure of other types of discovery information, 79 the
overwhelming majority of the cases involve trade secrets.
Various factors have been utilized by courts to determine whether
a protective order should be granted to restrict the disclosure of trade
secrets. 80 For example, in United States v. IBM,8 1 an antitrust suit
seeking civil damages, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the alleged confidential information
which the government sought to discover lacked secretive characteristics. The court stated that since there were no representations made
that the information was not available to employees nor any allegations
made of measures taken to guard the information's secrecy, the information could not be considered sufficiently secret to warrant a restric-

77. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (not restated in Second Restatement since no
change occurred in the law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note at 1-2
(1965)). The Restatement lists as examples of trade secrets "a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, . . . or a list of customers." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Thus, the definition of a trade secret, according to the Restatement, includes commercial information.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
79. In In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979), an order was sought to restrict disclosure
of CIA documents concerning surveillance of Vietnam war protestors. See also Alliance to End
Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976), where, in a civil rights action brought
against a federal agency, the court restricted the disclosure of documents.
80. See Essex Wire Co. v. Eastern Elec. Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (the court allowed disclosure of alleged secret information since the information could easily be acquired
through means other than discovery); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (considerations used by the court to determine if commercial information was secret enough
to warrant a protective order restricting disclosure included: extent to which information is
known to those outside and inside business; measures taken to guard secrecy of information; and
value of information to business and its competitors); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Brother Int'l Corp., 191
F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (the court held that information of sales and price data was not
rendered a trade secret merely due to the fact that plaintiff and defendant were competitors); Moss
v. Aetna Standard Eng. Co., 8 F.R.D. 323 (E.D.N.Y.1948) (the court held that the name of the
person supplying plaintiff with pins, bolts, dyes, and other material was not a trade secret).
The Restatement lists various factors to be considered in determining whether given information is secret:
(1)the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to
which it is known by [those] involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
81. 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tion on its disclosure. 82
Determining whether information is a trade secret is crucial to applying the good cause standard of rule 26(c). Generally, the courts
have not given trade secrets automatic and complete immunity against
disclosure8 3 but have weighed in each case a party's claim to privacy
against the need for disclosure.8 4 The party seeking a protective order
to restrict disclosure of discovered trade secrets must show with speci-

ficity how such disclosure will result in harm.8 5 This harm usually is
couched in the rubric of "competitive disadvantage. ' 86 At times, courts
have been so sensitive to the potential loss a litigant may suffer if required to produce valuable trade secrets that they have restricted discovery of the secrets altogether unless the party seeking discovery
established that the information was sufficiently relevant and necessary
to his case to outweigh the harm discovery would cause to the discoveree. 87 Once relevancy and necessity have been established, the
courts have imposed substantial restrictions on the disclosure of valua88
ble trade secrets.
Protective orders against disclosure of discovered trade secrets
generally are sought in either patent cases 89 or antitrust cases.90 Given
82. Id. at 49.
83. The common law tradition is to afford protection to trade secrets. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). The reason for this is that the existence
and ownership of a trade secret is a property right which results in a valuable competitive advantage. Speedry Chem. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1962); Farrand Optical
Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). To disclose the secret is to destroy the
property right. John T. Lloyd Laboratories, Inc. v. Lloyd Bros. Pharm., 131 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.
1942).
Secret processes and customer lists have been given special protection. United States v.
American Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580, 586 (N.D. Cal. 1966); American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania
Petroleum Prod. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680 (D.R.I. 1959).
84. Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F. 2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964
(1965); United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Although trade secrets embody commercial information, some courts see more harm emanating from the disclosure of traditional trade secrets. As one court put it, "disclosure of secret formulas will almost invariably result in this injury, . . . but the disclosure of two-and-a-half-yearold sales data will not." United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
85. United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
86. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 964 (1965); Metal Foil Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 55 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Va.
(1970); Essex Wire Co. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
87. Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324, 331 (9th Cir. 1961); Corbett v.
Free Press Ass'n, 50 F.R.D. 179 (D. Vt. 1970); Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods
Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
88. See text accompanying notes 96-110 infra.
89. See, e.g., Cleo Wrap Corp. v. Eisner Eng'r Works, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 386 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 33 (W.D. La. 1958). See also Tactical Use and.Abuse, supra note 3, at 137.
90. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965); United
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the substantial property interests in patent information and the fact that
disclosure of such technical information is not necessary for the public's welfare, a strong argument can be made for using a less strict good
cause standard in patent cases. 9' Accordingly, courts have been more
92
willing to grant orders restricting disclosure of patent information.
On the other hand, information on antitrust violations is eminently important to the public's welfare because the public, as consumers, will
generally pay higher prices when buying products from antitrust law
violators. 93 Recognizing this, Congress enacted section 137 of the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 94 which requires the discovery process in
antitrust litigation to be held in public. Consequently, a stricter good
cause standard than that applied in patent cases has been applied to
protective orders which seek to restrict trade secrets discovered in antitrust litigation. 95
There are several ways to limit the disclosure of secrets. One such
limitation on discovery is the in camera proceeding. 96 This proceeding
allows a judge to examine the discovered information in private before
States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Maritime Cinema Serv. Co. v. Movies En Route,
Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
91. See Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the
court, ruling on a protective order sought to restrict discovery of financial records, distinguished
patents from commercial information, indicating patents deserve more protection.
92. See Paul v. Sinnott, 217 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Pa. 1963), where the court granted a protective order in a patent infringement action even though defendant had not substantiated its allegations as to the existence of trade secrets; see also Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 61 F.R.D.
598 (D. Del. 1973); Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D.
Tex. 1968).
It is notable that issued patents become public information and thus enjoy no confidentiality
whatsoever. Camco, Inc. v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 384 (S.D. Tex. 1968). The patent
information involved in restriction requests includes patent applications, studies, and construction. See Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 61 F.R.D. 598 (D. Del. 1973); Struthers Scientific &
Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
93. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-58 (1911), where the Court stated
the specific evils of monopoly as the ability to fix prices, the ability to limit production, and the
deterioration in the quality of the monopoly product; see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 193 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), where the court said the purpose of an antitrust
action "is to protect the public interest which definitely includes the interest of defendant's competitors."
94. 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976).
95. United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Maritime Cinema Serv. Co. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. American Optical Co., 39
F.R.D. 580, 586 (N.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. Lever Bros., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Commercial information in actions other than antitrust has enjoyed protections similar to
patents. See Everco Indus., Inc. v. O.E.M. Prods. Co., 362 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. I11. 1973) (no
discovery of contracts and communications); Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, 50 F.R.D. 179 (D. Vt.
1970) (no discovery of net profit figures).
96. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 404-06 (1976); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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determining whether to issue an order restraining disclosure. The party
seeking in camera discovery must show good cause for such treatment.97 This showing of good cause parallels that required for any
other order restricting disclosure of discovery material: the party must
show that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, serious injury to the
98
person or corporation from which information is sought.
Another common limitation placed on the disclosure of discovered
trade secrets is to restrict the use of discovery material to the discoverer's counsel for the pending litigation only. This limitation has been
granted where the information sought included patent studies and applications concerning the characteristics of a steam iron,99 and identification of a process to freeze dry food. l°° The desire to protect
commercial information from disclosure motivated one court to grant
this restriction where the information sought consisted of financial
records, books and records concerning loan agreements, and merger
talks and records concerning privately financed research.101 Other
commercial information which courts have similarly limited includes
internal marketing information10 2 and information relating to competi10 3
tive pricing and customers.
Other restrictions preventing disclosure of trade secrets include requiring the party receiving the documents to specify the names of those
persons who will inspect the documents, as well as the time and manner
of inspection. 104 The rule 26(c) provisions allowing for sealing the discovered information by the court until the restriction is no longer
needed are also used frequently. 0 5 Once a deposition is sealed, it can
be opened only by order of the court.l°6 Such orders sealing confiden97. See, e.g., United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
98. Id. at 46. Both parties and their counsel should be permitted to participate in such in
camera proceedings so that the judge will benefit from an adversarial presentation. See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715-21 (1974); Black v. Sheraton Co. of America, 564 F.2d 531, 544-

45 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880
(1977).
99. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 61 F.R.D. 598 (D. Del. 1973).

100. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Co. v. General Foods Co., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
101.

Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

102. Metal Foil Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 55 F.R.D. 491 (E.D. Va. 1972) (advertising budgets).
103. National Utility Serv., Inc. v. Wisconsin Centrifugal Foundry, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 30 (E.D.
Wis. 1970).
104. See Paul v. Sinnott, 217 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Louis Weinberg Assoc. v. Monte
Christi Corp., Il F.R.D. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(6)-(c)(8). In ordering a deposition sealed, a court normally prohibits the parties and attorneys from making any disclosure of its contents to any third party. C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2042 (1970).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(6)-(c)(8).
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tial discovered information have been granted where the discovery ob07
tained would give valuable business information to competitors,
could be used in a related criminal proceeding, 108 or concerned the discoveree's illegal conduct and could create harmful publicity to the discoveree even though it might not be relevant at trial. 0 9 Yet another
method used at times to limit disclosure of confidential information is
the postponement of discovery until trial so that the relevancy of the
information sought can be seen more clearly.to
Thus, trade secrets traditionally have enjoyed substantial protection from disclosure. The courts continue to protect these secrets in
patent cases. However, apparently due to congressional action
prompted by a concern for the public's welfare, the courts have applied
a stricter good cause standard to orders restricting disclosure of information discovered in antitrust proceedings. The recent cases striking
down restrictions on disclosure of discovery as unconstitutional have
not involved trade secrets and do not appear to change the law applied
to cases involving trade secrets."'
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH DISCOVERY

Participants in the judicial process retain their first amendment
13
freedom of speech rights," 2 which apply to discovery materials."
Protective orders prohibiting the disclosure of discovery information
107. See Marshwood Co. v. Jamie Mills, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
108. See D'Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 272 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
109. See Nichols v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
110. See Lever Bros. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1941). The
court held that the trade secrets (a soap-making process) should not be discovered until the evidence at the trial indicated the relevancy of such information. Otherwise, the court said, a great
harm might occur to the moving party at a time when the relevancy of the information to the case
is still uncertain. Id. at 683. See also Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp., 34 F.R.D. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(the court held information on development and process of ureaformaldehyde foams subject to
the limitation); DeLong Co. v. Lucas, 138 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (the court granted the pretrial limitation on discovery in a breach of a "no competition" contract suit where the information
sought consisted of patent applications and work concerning development of over-water structures); International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (the court
granted the pretrial limitation in a patent infringement suit where discoverer requested defendant's analysis of molten metal at various stages in casting of crank shafts).
Ill. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F.
Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
112. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
113. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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constitute restrictions on the guarantee of free speech. 114 Thus, the
constitutionaility of such restrictions must be evaluated before a protective order may be issued.
Restrictions on the disclosure of discovery material may constitute
a prior restraint on the freedom of speech.' 5 Restraints which in effect
censor speech before it is made are regarded by the United States
Supreme Court as "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights."' 6 Consequently, while prior restraints are
not unconstitutional per se, 1 7 there is a "heavy presumption" against
their validity." 18 The fact that an order which restricts disclosure poses
many of the dangers of a prior restraint should be sufficient to require
close scrutiny of its impact on protected first amendment speech."t 9
The view that restrictions on the disclosure of discovery material
must be scrutinized closely to protect first amendment rights has surfaced only recently. Prior to 1977, two federal circuit courts of appeals
in three cases held that the first amendment's protection did not apply
as rigorously to restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained
through discovery as it did to restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained otherwise.' 20 As a result, these courts applied the rule
114. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp.
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
115. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979). "The term 'prior restraint,' at common law, referred to a system of unreviewable administrative censorship or licensing." Id. at 183.
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389-90 (1973);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-15 (1931). The United States Supreme Court has extended
the meaning of prior restraints to include judicial orders. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Among the judicial orders that have been considered, prior restraints are those restraining extrajudicial comment about a pending trial. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976);
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Chase v. Robson, 435
F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-31 to
12-33 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as TRIBE].
116. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
117. Whether a protective order restricting disclosure of discovery material may be deemed a
prior restraint is not dispositive of the constitutionality of such an order. "[Tihe term 'prior restraint' should not be used as 'a talismanic test.' " In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 186 (D.C. Cir.
1979), quoting Frankfurter, J., in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
118. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). See also New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (the Court held an injunction against publication by the New York Times of the contents of a classified government study unconstitutional as
a prior restraint on first amendment rights); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971) (an injunction to suppress the distribution of literature of any kind in plaintiff's
suburb was held unconstitutional as a prior restraint on first amendment rights).
119. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
120. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); International Prods.
Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); Parker v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 320
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1963). These courts did agree that the first amendment applied to restrictions on
the disclosure of discovered information. They felt, however, that satisfaction of the good cause
standard found in rule 26(c) would validate the restrictions' constitutionality. This view derives
from the notion of the court's power over its own process. See Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131,
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26(c) good cause standard to restrictions on the disclosure of discovery
material, while applying the United States Supreme Court's strict first
amendment "clear and present danger" standard' 2' to restrictions on
the disclosure of other information.
Parker v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.
In Parker v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,122 the plaintiff
shareholder attempted to set aside the results of an annual stockholders' meeting. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. In support of her motion, she filed an unsworn memo alleging fraud and
misconduct by defendant and its counsel.1 23 This memo contained information obtained through discovery. The federal district court ordered plaintiff to show cause why her memo should not be stricken.
The court also enjoined plaintiff and her agents from disseminating
outside of court any or all portions of the memo she had submitted and
24
from communicating any information it contained.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the order enjoining dissemination of plaintiffs memo "was
properly issued under the inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law
over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustice.' "125 However, the Second Circuit struck that part of the lower
court's order which barred communication of information found within
the memo because such an order "is repugnant to the First Amendment
1 26
to the Constitution."
Thus, the Parker court applied a liberal standard to uphold restrictions on the dissemination of discovery documents but applied the
much stricter constitutional standard to strike down restrictions on the
communication of information found in the documents. 27 Evidently,
144 (1888); International Prods. Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1963); Parker v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 320 F.2d 937, 938 (2d Cir. 1963); Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, 50
F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Vt. 1970).
121. The "clear and present danger" standard provides protection for speech unless such
speech creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the government has the power to prohibit. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945). See text
accompanying notes 115-19 supra; TRIBE, supra note 115, at §§ 12-9 to 12-11.
122. 320 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1963).
123. Id at 938.
124. Id

125. Id, citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888).
126. 320 F.2d at 939.
127. This distinction probably stems partly from the United States Supreme Court's opinion
that prohibition of extrajudicial statements concerning pending litigation should be judged against
the first amendment's strict "clear and present danger" standard. See text and accompanying note
190 infra.
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the Parker court read the power of a trial court over its discovery process to be so extensive as to allow that court to eliminate in effect a
party's first amendment right to distribute documents involved in the
litigation, regardless of whether those documents contained secret in28
formation.
InternationalProducts Corp. v. Koons
The notion that the first amendment is rendered impotent when
confronted by a trial court's restrictions on the disclosure of documents
involved in the discovery process was further refined in International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 129 another Second Circuit case. Koons involved a suit by a corporation against its former president for mismanagement and other fiduciary breaches. The current president of the
corporation was deposed by defendant Koons to discover information
concerning payments by the corporation to a foreign government official. Subsequently, the federal district court granted the motion for a
protective order to enjoin Koons from publicizing any matter con30
tained or referred to in the deposition.
The Second Circuit endorsed "the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of
information obtained by one party from another by use of the court's
processes."' 3' The court held unconstitutional that part of the order
which restricted the dissemination of information Koons had possessed
prior to discovery. 13 2 However, the court upheld the sealing of all affidavits submitted by defendants on various motions, although they were
not obtained through discovery. Thus, the rule of Koons is that requests for restrictions on the disclosure of information either obtained
through discovery or contained in papers filed with the court will be
judged against rule 26(c)'s good cause standard, while attempts to re128. None of the cases cited by Parkeras authority for the power of its own process concern a
conflict between the court's power and a constitutional right. See Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131,
144 (1888) (the court ordered a United States Marshal to restore defendant debtor's property to a
civil sheriff so that the property could be sold under petitioner's writ of execution); Pueblo de Taos
v. Archuleta, 64 F.2d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 1933) (the court dismissed a suit not brought for the
purpose of obtaining a judicial determination, but for the purpose of influencing Congress); Rudnicki v. McCormack, 210 F. Supp. 905, 908-12 (D.R.I. 1962) (the court enjoined repetitious and
baseless litigation); Pollack v. Aspbury, 14 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (the court dismissed a suit
in which the complaint contained numerous allegations of a libelous, scandalous, vituperative,
and impertinent nature).
129. 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
130. Id at 404 n.l. For the text of rule 26(c), which allows for protective orders, see note 4
supra.

131. 325 F.2d 403 at 407.
132. Id at 408-09.
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strict the disclosure of all other information will be subject to the strict
33
scrutiny standard of the first amendment.
Justification for applying the good cause standard to the sealed
affidavits which had not been obtained through discovery lies in the
court's inherent power over its own process. 134 According to the court,
the affidavits submitted by Koons acquired a "quasi-official appearance" which would encourage newspapers to publish them under their
privilege to report judicial proceedings. 35 The court also believed that
the quasi-official appearance of the affidavits might give them undeserved credibility with the public. 36 To prevent such potential misrepresentations, the court exercised its inherent powers to prohibit
publication of the affidavits. Such powers, according to the court,
could not be exercised over other information possessed prior to discovery because such information was not submitted to the court but
rather had been used merely to argue on motion.137 Thus, the Koons
court followed Parker by upholding a restriction on the disclosure of
any information involved in the court's process. Koons, therefore, reaffirmed the Second Circuit's subordination of the first amendment to a
38
court's inherent power over its process.
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.
The third case to decide the proper standard to apply to restrictions on disclosure of discovery was Rodgers v. United States Steel
Corp. ,139 decided in 1976 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Rodgers was a class action suit filed by a group of people injured by defendant's discriminatory employment policies. A suit
by the federal government against the defendant on the same
charges 40 had resulted in a consent decree requiring the defendant to
distribute over $30 million in back pay. 14 1 The plaintiffs in the class
action suit asked for a hearing to determine whether the settlement in
the consent decree was fair and adequate. In connection with this hearing, plaintiffs deposed an attorney of the Justice Department who had
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
826 (5th
141.

Id at 407-08.
ld
Id at 408.
Id
Id
Id
536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 63 F.R.D. I (N.D. Ala. 1974), aft'd, 517 F.2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
536 F.2d at 1003.
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negotiated the consent decree to obtain information on how the back
pay fund had been calculated. After trying unsuccessfully to prevent
the deposition, the United States obtained a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the information contained in the deposition. The order also prohibited dissemination of a document, known as exhibit 3,
which had not been obtained through discovery, but which contained
information similar to that found in the deposition. Plaintiffs appealed
and sought a writ of mandamus 42 directing the lower court to vacate
that protective order.
The Third Circuit held that restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained in a manner other than through the court's process are
valid only if they can withstand the rigorous standards by which prior
restraints of speech are judged. 143 However, restrictions on disclosure
of information obtained through, rather than merely involved in, the
court's process were permitted. Thus, the court concluded that the dep44
osition could not be disclosed but that exhibit 3 could be.'
Unlike Parker and Koons, Rodgers specifically defined the constitutional standard applied to restrictions on nondiscovery information.
That standard is the same one used to evaluate prior restraints on
speech. 145 The Rodgers court stated that "[w]hile a prior restraint is not
unconstitutional per se, it comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality." 46 According to Rodgers, there exist
two ways for an order to avoid the rigors of such a standard: (1) the
prior restraint must either fall within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints, 47 and must have
142. Mandamus is a writ which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction and is directed to
an inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act specified within the writ.
United States v. Boutwell, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 604 (1873). United States Courts of Appeals are
empowered to issue such writs. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (1976). Although mandamus is

a drastic remedy, "to be invoked only in extraordinary situations," Kerr v. United States Dist.
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976), it has been used by a number of courts to strike down orders
which contain similar restraints. See, e.g., In re Halkin 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Coles v.
Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 1975); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1062

(7th Cir. 1970). Mandamus is an especially appropriate remedy for these types of cases because
timeliness is important to the rights of expression protected by the first amendment. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). See generally Comment, The Expanding Use of
Mandamus to Review Texas District Court Disco very Orders.- An Immediate Appeal is Available, 32
Sw. L.J. 1283 (1979); Comment, The Use of Extraordinary Writsfor Interlocutory Appeals, 44
TENN. L. REV. 1377 (1976); Note, Civil Procedure-Mandamus-Review of a Discovery Order
Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4), 22 WAYNE L. REV. 179 (1975).
143. 536 F.2d at 1007.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id See note 115 supra.
147. Id Three of these exceptions were laid out in New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v.
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been accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger
of suppressing constitutionally protected speech; 148 or (2) the "disclosure of information concerning pending litigation by the parties or their
counsel would present a clear and present danger or a reasonable likelihood of a serious and imminent threat to the administration of jus49
tice." 1
Rodgers concluded that the order at hand, insofar as it restricted
the disclosure of exhibit 3, did not fall within any of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints. In the absence of any showing that disclosure of the methodology employed to
calculate the back pay proposal would pose a serious and imminent
threat, the court decided that the clear and present danger exception to
the prohibition against prior restraints did not apply despite defendant's assertion that the public policy in favor of informal settlements in
employment discrimination cases would be seriously undermined.' 5 0
Thus, the court denied the order restricting disclosure of exhibit 3.
Analogous Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has not decided directly the relationship of the first amendment's guarantee of free speech to restrictions on disclosure of discovered information. However, recent
Supreme Court decisions have considered the argument that the source
of information or the manner of its acquisition determines the presence
or absence of first amendment protection. The Court has also considered the waiver argument relied upon in Rodgers and Koons which
contends that parties to the discovery process implicitly waive any first
amendment protection in the discovered information.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,t5 t certain corporations challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts criminal statute which
prohibited them from spending money to publicize their views on a
United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 420 U.S. 371 (1975). The
court said:
One is that the information is of such nature that it is not protected by the first amendment. The second is that although the information ordinarily is protected by the first
amendment, the agency applying the restraint is exempt from its strictures. The third is
that although the information is protected and the agency is not exempt from the first
amendment, the restraint is only reasonably incidental to the achievement of another
valid governmental purpose.
491 F.2d at 222 (citations omitted).
148. Id See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963).
149. 536 F.2d at 1008. See note 121 supra.
150. 1d
151.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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proposed constitutional amendment that would have permitted the legislature to impose a graduated personal income tax. The Court held
that the statute violated the first amendment, disregarding the state's
argument that the speech emanated from a corporation other than one
engaged in the communications business and, therefore, was unpro15 2
tected by the first amendment.
The Court reasoned that "the inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source. . . ."113 Rather, the speech is protected because
it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of information.1 54 That
the information in Bellotti was commercial was a factor in the Court's
155
assessment of the furtherance of societal interests.
While Bellotti is authority for the proposition that the identity of
the source of information does not determine first amendment protection, New York Times Co. v. United States156 addressed the manner of
acquisition and held that disclosure even of information that was obtained by theft is protected by the first amendment. In New York
Times, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to enjoin publication
by the New York Times and the Washington Post of the contents of a
classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy." The study had been obtained from an unknown
person in violation of a federal criminal statute which prohibited passing sensitive information relating to national defense. 57 Despite the
fact that the study had been obtained illegally, the Court upheld the
newspapers' first amendment right to disclose the documents on the
grounds that the Government failed to show proper justification for the
imposition of a prior restraint of expression.15 8 Thus, Supreme Court
152. Id at 767.
153. Id at 777. See also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
154. 435 U.S. at 783. The Court cited Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), as precedent for this holding. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy held that a Virginia statute which prohibited the advertising of the prices of prescription
drugs violated the first amendment's protection of free speech. The Court disregarded Virginia's
argument that the speech was commercial and, therefore, according to the commercial speech
doctrine, unprotected by the first amendment. The Court reasoned that the focus of first amendment analysis should not be placed on whether the speech is commercial but rather on the degree
to which the expression furthers the societal interest in the free flow of information. Id at 764.
155. 435 U.S. at 777. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
156. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
157. Id at 745 (Marshall, J., concurring).
158. Id at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring). See also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309,
1317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), where the court held that a former CIA employee has first amendment rights in the dissemination of unclassified information retained in
violation of a secrecy oath.
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decisions offer little support for the emphasis placed on the source of
the information by Parker,Koons, and Rodgers.
Another rationale found in both Rodgers and Koons 159 to prevent
the application of the first amendment's protections to restrictions on
disclosure of discovery is waiver. Rodgers expands on Koons to suggest
that "the parties and counsel, by taking advantage of or a part in the

discovery processes, implicitly waive their first amendment rights'freely
to disclose or disseminate the information obtained through those
processes." 1 60 However, according to the United States Supreme
Court, the idea that a party waives his first amendment right to disclose

discovery information is clearly untenable. In various criminal cases,
the United States Supreme Court has held that waiver of constitutional
rights is not to be inferred lightly. t6' The Court has expressed disap62
proval of waiver of first amendment rights in civil suits as well.
In CurtisPublishing Co. v. Butts, 63 a civil diversity suit involving a
libel action, the Supreme Court held that waivers of first amendment
rights are to be inferred only in "clear and compelling" circumstances.
In Butts, a university football coach sued defendant for publishing an
article accusing him of conspiring to "fix" a football game. Unaware of
a recent Court decision granting defendants greater first amendment
protection from state libel claims, t64 Curtis defended only on the basis
of state libel law. Upon notice of the relevant Supreme Court decision,
159. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); International
Prods. Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
160. 536 F.2d at 1006.
161. See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 196 (1955) (no waiver of privilege against
self-incrimination); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949) (petitioner's immunity from
prosecution on the facts to which he was compelled to testify was not waived by a subsequent
voluntary statement); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (no waiver of right to counsel absent
showing of intentional relinquishment of a known right); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,
393 (1937) (no waiver of right to jury trial); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (no waiver
of right to jury trial).
162. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 145 (1967). In Perry, the United States Supreme Court indicated its disapproval of a court
order which conditions a privilege of access on a waiver of first amendment rights when it noted
that:
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons. . . [ilt may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow
the government to "produce a result which [it] could not command directly"..
Such
interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
408 U.S. at 597, citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
163. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
164. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Curtis promptly argued the constitutional issue. Butts, however, contended that Curtis waived its newly discovered first amendment right
by failing to assert such a right before trial. The Court held that Curtis
had not implicitly waived its first amendment right to publish the article absent a showing of clear and compelling circumstances. The Court
stated:
[T]he constitutional protection which is claimed to have been waived
safeguards a freedom which is the "matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom". . . .Where the ultimate effect of sustaining a claim of waiver might be an imposition on
that valued freedom, we are unwilling to find waiver in circumstances which fall short of being clear and compelling.' 65
It could hardly be said that Rodgers or Koons contained such clear
and compelling circumstances as are required to overcome the strong
presumption against waiver of first amendment rights. Koons was simply a corporate mismanagement case and Rodgers an ordinary employment discrimination suit. In fact, the Rodgers court admitted the
absence of clear and compelling circumstances when it denied that
plaintiffs waived their first amendment right to disclose exhibit 3, the
document which had not been obtained through discovery.166 For the
Rodgers court to argue that clear and compelling circumstances suddenly appear when disclosure of discovery information is involved
would be totally inconsistent. Thus, in Rodgers and Koons, the absence of clear and compelling circumstances would preclude any presumption that the parties waived their first amendment rights.
CLOSER SCRUTINY OF A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DISCLOSE
DISCOVERED INFORMATION

Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's
Two recent cases have rejected as incorrect the distinction drawn
in the Parker-Koons-Rodgerstrilogy. 6 7 They conclude that the first
amendment standard for judging prior restraints should be applied to
all protective orders which restrict the disclosure of information, regardless of the source of the information. In Reliance Insurance Co. v.
Barron's,168 plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York against a financial newspaper
which had published an article that allegedly defamed the plaintiff by
165. 388 U.S. at 145 (citations omitted).
166. 536 F.2d at 1007 n.14.
167. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp.
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
168. 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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labeling his business practices as showing "bad business judgment."'' 69
When the newspaper tried to discover various information from plaintiff company, including numerous internal documents and records evidencing Reliance's accounting practices, plaintiff sought a protective
order to forbid disclosure of the information to all but defendant's attorneys. In addition, the proposed order forbade the use of the information in any articles and books, except to the extent that the
information was of public record.
The district court denied plaintiff a protective order after determining that plaintiff had failed to show sufficient expected harm to
meet rule 26(c)'s good cause standard.' 70 The court then proceeded to
apply the first amendment standard to the order to determine whether
plaintiff could at least require that the contested documents be submitted under seal for an in camera inspection. 7 1 In doing so, the Barron's
court had discarded the Parker-Koons-Rodgers'distinction between restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained through discovery
and information obtained otherwise by reasoning that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to determine whether published information, claimed to be within the protective order, was obtained in
72
violation of the order or obtained through other means.'
The constitutional standard applied by the Barron's court to the
order is defined as a requirement that the moving party "demonstrate
that the material to be restrained is, indeed, confidential, and that its
publication would cause plaintiff to suffer serious and irreparable injury."' 73 The court found that plaintiff had failed to show the requisite
injury and consequently denied his motion for a protective order.

169. Id at 201.
170. Plaintiff simply offered in support of its motion affidavits prepared by its attorneys. The
court held that the allegations contained in the affidavits failed to show that the discovery was
confidential or that harm would result. Id at 204. See note 68 supra.
171. Id at 204. For a discussion of in camera inspection, see text accompanying notes 96-98
supra.

172. 428 F. Supp. at 205.
173. Id at 204. Although the language of the Barron's standard differs somewhat from the
language of the constitutional standard enunciated in Rodgers that there be a "clear and present
danger," the two are parallel in substance. Both require a very explicit showing that substantial
injury will result from the disclosure of information before allowing restrictions on such disclosure. Thus, Rodgers and Barron'sdo not differ in the constitutional standard they apply to restrictions on the disclosure of information. Rather, they differ in their determination of whether to
apply such a standard to all disclosure restrictions or merely to those restrictions on disclosure of
non-discovery material. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.
1976).
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In re Halkin
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit decided the constitutionality of protective orders
which seek to restrict the disclosure of discovery information. In re
Halkin 174 involved a suit by a number of individuals alleging that certain government agencies, principally the Central Intelligence Agency
of
and the National Security Agency, conducted unlawful programs 175
surveillance of United States citizens who opposed the Vietnam war.
During discovery, the plaintiffs received from the CIA documents concerning the surveillance programs. Plaintiffs then gave written notice
76
to the CIA that they planned to release these documents to the press. 1
In response, the defendants obtained a protective order under rule 26(c)
which prohibited dissemination or disclosure of any documents or information not of public record. Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court's order. 177 The District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that the order was unconstitutional when judged
178
against a standard similar to that used for prior restraints of speech,
despite the CIA's claim that an unfair trial would result from the disclosure.
Reasoning of the Court
The court in Halkin expressly rejected the distinction drawn in
Parker, Koons, and Rodgers.179 In doing so, the court relied on First
NationalBank v. Bellotti 8 0 to determine that the extent of first amendment protection granted to speech does not depend on how or where
the information was acquired. 18 ' The court thus concluded that application of the strict constitutional standard would not be foreclosed by
the fact that the information to be disclosed was acquired through the
182
discovery process.
174. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
175. The Central Intelligence Agency is hereinafter referred to as the CIA.
176. 598 F.2d at 181.
177. Id at 182.
178. Id at 197.

179. See id. at 187-89.
180. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
181.

598 F.2d at 187.

182. For a critical discussion of the Halkin court's reliance on Bellotti, see Comment, The First
Amendment Right to Disseminate Discovery Materials: In reHalkin, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1550 (1979)
[hereinafter referred to as First Amendment Right]. The author suggests that Halkin improperly
relied on Bellotti to discount completely the source of the speech as a factor in evaluating first
amendment protection of the speech. Id at 1555. See also Comment, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 900
(1979).
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The court's application of the first amendment standard to the restrictions imposed in Ha/kin resulted from its view that the order "constitutes direct governmental action limiting speech." 18 3 Plaintiffs
argued that the order constituted a prior restraint. 814 Although conceding that a rule 26(c) order restricting disclosure of discovery information is a very narrow prior restraint since it is limited to specific
expression, 8 5 the Halkin court concluded that the order is similar

enough to a prior restraint "to require close scrutiny of its impact on
protected First Amendment expression."'' 8 6 Relying generally on the

notion that litigation is a public proceeding 187 and specifically on cases
holding unconstitutional orders that restrain extrajudicial comment by
parties and lawyers, 88 the majority of the court concluded that the first
amendment standard should be applied to the order at hand.
The majority opinion then focused on the proper constitutional
standard to be used. According to the Halkin court, once a trial court
determines the nature of the protective order's restraint on expression,
it "must then evaluate such a restriction on three criteria: the harm
posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining
order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less di1 89
rectly on expression."'
The first criterion, that the harm must be substantial and serious, is
one that has been used in a line of decisions known as the FairTrial v.
Free Speech cases which deal with the first amendment's application to
extrajudicial statements in general.190 This criterion is more commonly
183. 598 F.2d at 183.
184. For a discussion of prior restraints, see text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
185. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 185 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
186. Id at 186.
187. Id at 187. But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), where the Court
excluded the public and the press from a pretrial suppression hearing in a murder prosecution.
The Gannett Court seems to disfavor the publicizing of pretrial proceedings. However, the Court
was quick to point out that it decided only the narrow issue of whether the Constitution requires
that a pretrial hearing for a motion to suppress evidence be opened to the public, although all the
participants in the litigation agreed to protect the defendants' fair trial rights. Id at 393-94. Indeed, the Court stated that "the Sixth Amendment permits and even presumes open trials as a
norm." Id at 385. Fearing that its holding may be misconstrued, the Court said, "[w]e certainly
do not disparage the general desirability of open judicial proceedings," id at 393, and noted that
the Court was not confronted with that issue.
188. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Chase v.
Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). These cases, holding orders restricting extrajudicial comment on pending litigation to be prior restraints, stem from the line of cases known as the Fair
Trial v. Free Speech cases. See text and accompanying note 190 infra.
189. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
190. The Fair Trial Y.Free Speech cases involve a conflict between the right to freedom of
speech guaranteed by the first amendment and the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the sixth and
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known as the "clear and present danger" test which provides protection
for speech unless the expression creates a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantial evil. 91 Due to its imprecise language, the
"clear and present danger" test does not in a practical way solve the
problem of evaluating the constitutional validity of particular restrictions.192 As Justice Brandeis said in his concurring opinion in Whitney
v. California, 93 "[this Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to
determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present."' 94 In response thereto, the
United States Supreme Court has created a working principle which
states "that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."' 19 5 The Halkin court adopted this principle as the first of three
fifth amendments. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (the Court held
unconstitutional a prior order restraining a newspaper from publishing any information "strongly
implicative" of an accused murderer); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (the Court held
unconstitutional a contempt of court order issued against certain public officials for publicly criticizing grand jury proceedings); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (a restraint of
parties' counsel from commenting on the pending case was held unconstitutional); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (an order banning relatives,
close friends, and associates of parties from making extrajudicial statements was held unconstitutional). See generally TRIBE, supra note 115, at § 12-1i.
In contrast to those decisions where the strict "clear and present danger" standard is applied
to restraints on the freedom of speech when that freedom interferes with a fair trial, a group of
cases has held that a lesser standard is to be used. These cases hold that where it is "reasonably
likely" that an unfair trial will result, then the restraint on freedom of speech, whether prior or
post, must stand. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (the Court upheld an order issued
by the trial court to prevent the press from televising the trial); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d
661 (10th Cir. 1969) (the court upheld an order issued prohibiting publication of any comments by
parties, counsel, or witnesses concerning the pending litigation).
191. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), where the Court upheld a federal statute
which disallowed circulation of literature which denounced the United States system of conscription. See also text and accompanying note 121 supra.
192. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941).
193. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
194. Id at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
195. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). The dissenting opinion in Halkin argues
that less crippling harm will justify a protective order. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent cites two examples of what it considers sufficient harm:
business interests, see Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
and personal embarrassment, see Nichols v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Pa.
1958). Concerning the majority's requirement that there be an exceedingly high probability of the
harm occurring, the dissent says only a reasonable likelihood of occurrence is necessary. 598 F.2d
at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Lastly, the dissent points out that the formal and specific factual
findings necessary to justify an order which restricts freedom of speech under the FairTrial v. Free
Speech line of cases, see note 190 supra, is not necessary to justify orders restricting disclosure of
discovery materials. "[lt is enough that the district court provide a record sufficient for meaningful review." 598 F.2d at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent's position, however, is based on
the source of the information whose disclosure is sought to be restricted. Such a position, as
already related, seems untenable in light of the United States Supreme Court's first amendment
doctrine. See text accompanying notes 151-58 supra.
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criteria against which protective orders restricting the disclosure of dis96
covery material should be evaluated.
In most cases dealing with orders restricting the disclosure of discovered information, the harm expected to result from disclosure is a
competitive disadvantage to the discoveree. 197 In Halkin, however, the
court was applying the first criterion of its constitutional standard to a
claim by the discoveree that the disclosure of discovered information
would result in an unfair trial. The court mentioned two factors by
which to assess the strength of a claim that an unfair trial will result:
whether the trial is civil or criminal and whether a bench or jury trial is
involved. 198 The court concluded that in criminal trials the argument
that extrajudicial statements will harm the defendant substantially and
seriously is much stronger than the same argument raised in a civil
trial. 199 As to the bench or jury trial factor, the Halkin court decided
that a principal concern about pretrial publicity is that a jury will be
prejudiced; therefore, the argument that disclosure of discovered infor2 °°
mation will result in an unfair trial will be stronger in jury trials.
Thus, Halkin's first criterion varies depending on the harm expected to
result without the protective order.
The second constitutional standard set forth in Halkin to evaluate
restrictions on the disclosure of discovered information is the "precision of the restrictions. ' '20 ' This criterion requires a specific showing
that harm is likely to occur, to assure that the protective order is no
broader than is absolutely necessary to prevent such harm from occur196. 598 F.2d at 192.
197. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
198. 598 F.2d at 192-93.
199. Id The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, although not ruling on a
requested restriction on discovery, agreed with Halkin's greater concern over extrajudicial statements made in a criminal case as opposed to those made in a civil case when it noted that "although we rightfully place a prime value on providing a system of impartial justice to settle civil
disputes, we require even a greater insularity against the possibility for interference with fairness
in criminal cases." Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976). The Seventh Circuit justified its conclusion on three grounds:
(1)the difference in the sixth amendment's requirement of an "impartial jury" in criminal cases as
opposed to the seventh amendment's guarantee of only a "trial by jury" for civil cases; (2) the
difference in the length of civil and criminal trials-civil being much longer, thereby diluting the
effect of any pretrial publicity; and (3) the nature of civil litigation, in that many times a civil suit
is brought expressly for the purpose of gaining information for the public. 522 F.2d at 258.
200. 598 F.2d at 193. The contention that bench trials are less likely to be prejudiced than jury
trials is credible despite the fact that judges are human and thus susceptible to the influence of
prejudicial information, see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 565 (1965), since judges are "supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
376 (1947).
201. 598 F.2d at 193.
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ing. 202

How probable such harm must be in order to satisfy this second
criterion remains an open question. 20 3 Two formulas have been predominant in the courts' attempts to "crystallize the appropriate standard" 2°4 for evaluating the probability of harm stemming from a
protective order which restricts extrajudicial statements in general: (1)
the "reasonable likelihood" of harm test 20 5 and (2) the "serious and

imminent threat" of harm test. 2°6 A lower probability of harm satisfies
the "reasonable
likelihood" test than will satisfy the "serious threat"
7
test.20
When the harm expected to result from disclosing discovered information is an unfair trial, a difficult conflict arises between the constitutionally based rights to a fair trial 208 and to freedom of speech. Both
rights are believed to be fundamental to the maintenance of liberty in
our society. 20 9 The Halkin court suggests that in such a situation, the
trial court should analyze the type of discovery documents, in conjunction with the type of litigation, to determine the probability of harm
necessary to restrict first amendment rights. 210 The federal circuits are
split as to which standard to apply when confronted with a conflict
21
between the right to free speech and the right to a fair trial. '
202. Id "[T]he trial court, [therefore], must also require a specific showing that dissemination
of the discovery materials would pose a concrete threat to an important countervailing interest."
Id (emphasis added).
203. As the Halkin court stated, "[clourts have struggled mightily to capture in words the
requisite probability of harm mandated by the First Amendment, seeking to maximize the range
of possible expression consistent with the valid claims of important conflicting interests." Id at
193 n.42.
204. Id
205. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d
661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Society of Professional Journalists v. Martin,
431 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.S.C.), afd with qualications,556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1148-52 (E.D. Va.
1976).
206. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238
(6th Cir. 1975); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971).
207. See note 190 supra.
208. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides, in pertinent part:
No person shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against; to have
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
209. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
210. 598 F.2d at 193 n.42.
211. See note 190 supra. The confusion that confronts the courts as to the probability of harm
needed to overcome first amendment protections against restrictions on disclosure of discovered
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The last criterion, that less intrusive alternatives do not exist,
means that once the requisite likelihood of harm is found, if there is no
other way to prevent such harm, then the protective order may be
granted. For example, when the harm expected to result from disclosure of discovery material is an unfair trial, the court's alternatives to a
2t 3
21 2
protective order include a change of venue, postponement of trial,
or sequestration of jurors. 21 4 The alternatives are not so plentiful when
the alleged harm is business damage. This should increase the likelihood that a protective order restricting disclosure of discovered information will be issued when the harm expected to result from disclosure
is business damage.
Thus, the majority in Halkin views the conflict between the first
amendment's guarantee of free speech and restrictions on disclosure of
discovery material which are alleged necessary to prevent an unfair
trial as an extension of the conflict involved in the Fair Trial v. Free
Speech cases. Accordingly, the Halkin court applies to its order restricting disclosure of discovery, with some modification, the constitutional standard which the Fair Trial v. Free Speech cases apply to
restrictions on the publication of any extrajudicial comments concerning pending litigation. This constitutional standard evaluates requested protective orders on three criteria: whether the harm from
disclosure is substantial, whether the order is drawn narrowly, and
whether alternatives to the order exist.
Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion in Halkin denounces the majority's application of the strict constitutional standard to the protective order,
thereby illustrating that the rationale of the Parker, Koons, and Rodgers decisions has not been forgotten.2 15 In keeping with the tradition
of the trilogy, the Halkin dissent argues that prior restraints can be diinformation when the competing interest is the sacred, constitutional right to a fair trial should
dissipate when the competing interest is not so fundamental to liberty. Thus, when damage to
business from disclosure of trade secrets is offered as the competing interest, the higher probability
of harm-"serious and imminent threat"--could more easily be used to decide whether an order
restricting the disclosure of such information was drawn narrowly enough. See In re Halkin, 598
F.2d 176, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
However, the fact that alternatives to a protective order do not exist to protect a discoveree from
business damage resulting from disclosure of secret discovery information may negate any increase in first amendment protection that would result from the use of the "serious threat" of harm
test. See text accompanying notes 212-14 infra.
212. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976).
213. Id
214. Id
215. 598 F.2d at 200-15 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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vided into two categories: those solely directed at information and documents obtained in discovery and all other orders restricting
expression. 21 6 Only the second type of restraint, the dissent contends,
requires the application of the constitutional standard; the first type is
judged by rule 26(c)'s good cause standard. 21 7 Underlying this contention is the theory that since the litigants obtain information through the
discovery process over which the court has extensive power, the first
amendment interests in protecting the free publication of that information can be limited by this power. 2' 8 Judge Wilkey stated that "litigants who wish to disseminate discovery materials have gained access
to such materials-access which they would not ordinarily havethrough a statutory system that expressly reserves to the courts the
power to attach restrictions on the use of such materials. '2 19 The same
theory was used in Rodgers and, as already shown, seems untenable in
light of the United States Supreme Court's holdings against presump220
tions of waivers of fundamental rights.
Critique of the Courts' Resolution of FirstAmendment Rights in
Discovery
Halkin now stands as the strongest precedent for the use of a strict
constitutional standard to judge restrictions on disclosure of discovered
information. This constitutional standard can be compared with rule
26(c)'s good cause standard as it applies to restrictions on disclosure of
discovered information. The good cause standard requires a showing
of a probable, serious, and clearly defined harm to the party against
22
whom discovery is sought before a protective order will be granted, '
whereas an imminent and extremely serious harm is required to pronounce such an order constitutional. Although similar in form, the difference in substance between these two standards may be considerable.
The constitutional standard requires specific factual findings of substantial and serious harm which would result from disclosure of discovered information. 222 The rule 26(c) standard, on the other hand,
merely requires a showing that the harm is not theoretical but likely
and that the harm is serious, not trivial.22 3 Thus, showing the harm
216. Id at 204.
217. Id
218. Id at 206.
219. Id

220.
221.
222.
223.

See
See
See
Id

text accompanying notes 161-65 supra.
text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
Brink v. Dalesio, 82 F.R.D. 664, 678 (D. Md. 1979).
See also text and accompanying note 68 supra.
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necessary to support an order restricting disclosure of discovery information should be substantially more difficult under the constitutional
test than under rule 26(c)'s good cause standard.
Although Barron's and Halkin clearly hold for the use of the constitutional standard, it can be argued that their holdings should be limited to their facts. Barron's involved an order which restricted a
newspaper from disclosure. 224 Newspapers traditionally have received
special protection under the first amendment. 225 Thus, it can be argued
that the Barron's court applied the constitutional standard to the protective order only because of the special importance courts place on a
free and unrestricted press. However, recent United States Supreme
Court decisions which deny special first amendment protection to the
226
press render this restrictive reading of Barron's unlikely.
Halkin's holding can also be argued as limited to its facts. The
primary purpose of the first amendment's protection of free speech is to
enlighten public decision-making in a democracy. 227 Since Halkin involved a case against governmental agencies, 228 the disclosure of any
information obtained from those agencies would be fundamental for
the public to make enlightened decisions about their government.
Thus, it can be argued that the Halkin court applied the constitutional
standard to the order only because information about the government
was involved. However, the Halkin court intended its holding to be
read more broadly. The court not only expressed its dissatisfaction
with the Parker, Koons, and Rodgers holdings 229 but it expressly concluded that in each case a trial judge must determine that the protective
order meets the criteria mandated by the first amendment. 230 Thus, the
District of Columbia Circuit's strong advocation of the use of a constitutional standard cannot be interpreted away by an attempt to narrow
the court's holding to its facts.

224. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
225. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
226. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (the Court approved exclusion of
the press from a pretrial suppression hearing in a murder prosecution); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978) (the Court denied a newspaper's claim that the first amendment required that
a search of the newsroom should proceed by subpoena rather than by the more intrusive search
warrant).
227. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
228. 598 F.2d at 179-80.
229. Id at 188-89.
230. Id at 195.
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THE GOOD CAUSE STANDARD V. THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
STANDARD

The principal question that emerges from this note is whether to
use the "good cause" standard or the first amendment "clear and present danger" standard to evaluate orders which restrict disclosure of discovery. Although use of the good cause standard will offer discoverees
more adequate protection from harm expected to result from disclosure, use of the constitutional standard finds support in both logic and
policy.
The theory that a court's inherent power over its own process, in
and of itself, justifies an abrogation of a discoverer's first amendment
rights is logically unsound. The underlying justification for the grant of
an order restricting expression derives from a balancing of the benefits
to be brought about by the order with the first amendment interests in
freedom of expression, not in any independent notion of the court's
inherent power. 231 To conclude otherwise would return our jurispru-

dence to the days when kings had the ability to justify incursions into
232
one's fundamental rights solely on the basis of their inherent power.
Since the proper focus in deciding the permissibility of restraints
on disclosure of discovery information should be on the balancing of
the competing interests involved in the restraint, the inclusion of the
first amendment interest would mandate the use of the strict constitutional standard. 233 The Halkin dissent, as well as Koons and Rodgers,
attempt to avoid this analysis by altering the interests involved in a
Halkin situation. By using the court's inherent power over its own
process to justify conditioning access to discovery on a waiver of first
amendment rights, 2 3 4 Halkin's dissent, Koons, and Rodgers eliminate
the first amendment interest which, if involved, would command the
231. A protective order which restricts disclosure of discovery must satisfy rule 26(c)'s good
cause standard before it can issue. This standard is a balancing test, weighing the benefits expected to result from the order against the discoverer's interests in disclosure. See text accompanying notes 24 and 55 supra. Included within the discoverer's interest in disclosure is his first
amendment right to protection of free speech. See text accompanying notes 112-14 and 167-88
supra. The United States Supreme Court uses a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of
restrictions on free expression. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762-70 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). See also
Bogen, BalancingFreedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REV. 387 (1979).
232. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 276-77 (1924) [hereinafter referred
to as HOLDSWORTH].
233. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp.
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
234. See text accompanying notes 134-38, 143-44 and 218 supra.
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use of a strict standard. 23 5 With the first amendment interest no longer
involved, the lower good cause standard can be applied justifiably to
restrictions on disclosure of discovery. This attempt to circumvent an
application of a standard properly based on the interests involved
should fail in light of the United States Supreme Court's abhorrence
for finding waivers of first amendment rights. 236 Indeed, the Court has
expressly stated that "a court may not escape the task of assessing the
First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public
interest allegedly served by the [restriction]. ' 237 Thus, according to the
logic which the United States Supreme Court applies in its analysis of
first amendment interests, the strict constitutional standard should be
applied to restrictions on disclosure of discovery.
Although use of a strict constitutional standard will deny protective orders where the less strict good cause standard would have allowed them, trade secrets can still remain protected under an
application of the stricter standard. First amendment analysis considers the extent to which the content of the information informs the public as a factor for evaluating restraints on the expression of such
information. 238 Since disclosure of trade secrets is not as valuable for
informing the public as disclosure of government secrets, for example,
protective orders denying disclosure of trade secrets will more likely
withstand the scrutiny of the constitutional standard. 239 Most important, the use of the constitutional standard allows for a realistic consideration of the value of disclosure of the information whereas the use of
235. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp.
200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
236. See text accompanying notes 159-65 supra.
237. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975). Bigelow involved a suit against a newspaper editor for publishing an advertisement announcing that it would arrange low cost abortions,
thereby violating a Virginia statute. The court held the statute unconstitutional in violation of the
first amendment's protection of free speech. The Court rejected the state's argument that because
the advertisement was "commercial," it was unprotected by the first amendment. Id at 825.
238. In First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the United States Supreme Court
focused on the worth of the speech for informing the public, rather than the source of the speech,
in analyzing the constitutionality of the statute alleged to have restrained first amendment rights.
Id at 783. A principal factor for determining constitutionality, according to the Court, is the
content of the speech. Id at 777. Since Bellotti involved a restraint on expression concerning
governmental affairs, a "type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy," the
Court struck down the restraint. Id See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); In re
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979), where the court stated that first amendment interests vary
according to the type of expression subject to the order. The court noted that "[ain order restraining . . . political speech, implicates different interests than an order restraining commercial
information." Id.at 191 (citations omitted).
239. See note 238 supra. Patent information may command more protection than information
discovered in antitrust proceedings. See text accompanying notes 89-95 supra.
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the good cause standard does not. 240
Policy considerations also justify using the stricter standard to assess restrictions on disclosure of discovery. It is the general position of
both courts and legislatures that pretrial proceedings of the federal judicial system are ordinarily conducted in public. 24 ' It is only through
public proceedings that the administration of justice can occur. 242 Lest
we return to the secret inquiries of the Star Chamber, 24 3 the strict constitutional standard should be used to provide adequate protection for
disclosure of discovery material.
An argument is made that use of the strict constitutional standard
burdens an already overburdened discovery process 244 by encouraging
litigants to discover greater amounts of information in the hope that
embarrassing information will be found. However, rule 26(b) limits
discovery to only information relevant and necessary to the pending
litigation. 245 Also, the far greater burden will be placed on courts using
the good cause standard. Upon ruling on a requested protective order,
the courts must rummage through discovered information to decide
whether publicized information was derived from discovery. 246 Thus,
the claim that using a stricter standard in judging restrictions on disclosure of discovery will result in further burdens to an already overworked discovery process is tenuous at best.
IMPLICATIONS OF USING A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

Apparently, use of the strict constitutional standard to evaluate restrictions on disclosure of discovery produces an anomaly. It now becomes easier to restrict discovery itself than to restrict disclosure of the
discovery. This would seem to run afoul of the very purpose of the
discovery rules; that is, to allow a liberal flow of information between
the parties. Such is not necessarily the case.
240. See text and accompanying note 238 supra.
241. See Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964); Essex Wire Corp. v.
Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969); FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a); note 49 supra
and accompanying text; see also Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976) (discovery process in antitrust litigation to be held in public).
242. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); text

accompanying note 49 supra.
243. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 232, at ch. IV, § I.
244. See FirstAmendment Right, supra note 182, at 1559.
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
246. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in camera inspection places heavy burden of
inspection on trial judges).
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247
Because courts rarely grant orders denying discovery altogether,
the comparative ease with which restrictions on discovery are granted
does not prevent the flow of information but merely alters it. Also,
because protective orders are sought to restrict specific instances of
abuse during the discovery process, they create little impediment to the
generally free flow of information. Absent use of the constitutional
standard, however, the public may be precluded from exposure to appropriate information. Furthermore, courts for some time have recognized that rule 26(c)'s good cause requirement itself applies a stricter
standard to restrictions on disclosure of discovery. 248 Therefore, as the
courts have recognized, the apparently anomalous result of using a constitutional standard is justified by the small intrusion restrictions on
discovery place on the discovery process as compared to the substantial
hindrance restrictions on disclosure place on the public's right to know.
Commentators argue that use of the constitutional standard may
make courts reluctant to grant discovery of sensitive information in the
249
first place for fear that future attempts to prevent disclosure may fail.
A recent district court case views the potential effects of the Halkin
standard as less prohibitive. In Brink v. Dalesio,250 plaintiff, a union
member, brought suit against the union and one of its officers claiming
numerous violations of statutorily imposed fiduciary obligations allegedly owed to the union and its members. Because defendant had been
under investigation by the United States Attorney's Office for related
activities, an order sealing certain documents had been imposed. Plaintiff sought to lift the seal on the grounds that it unjustifiably burdened
restraint on free expression.
the judicial process and constituted a25prior
1
The court denied plaintiffs request.
Commenting generally on Halkin, the Brink court emphasized
that the ultimate impact of the use of the Halkin standard has been
exaggerated. The court noted that the standard still leaves the judicial
inquiry considerable flexibility in determining the variables of the
Halkin approach. The court added that the new standard simply entails additional scrutiny of a judge's good cause determination and will
not alter present procedures, assuming judges have good reasons for
their orders. 252 Thus, fears over the potentially prohibitive effects of
247.
248.
249.
(1979).
250.
251.
252.

See text accompanying note 41 supra.
See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
See First Amendment Right, supra note 182, at 1559; Comment, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 900
82 F.R.D. 664 (D. Md. 1979).
Id at 678.
Id at 677-78.
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using the constitutional standard should be allayed by this recent inter25 3
pretation and application of Halkin.
Thus, at first glance, use of the constitutional standard seems unreasonable. However, upon closer examination, it appears that the
standard allows for a more realistic evaluation of the interests involved
by considering the value of the information to be disclosed for informing the public. Trial courts will not be foreclosed altogether from restricting disclosure of discovery. They simply must support the
issuance of their orders with more specific findings of fact, attempt to
draw their orders more precisely, and look for alternatives which impinge less on the right to free speech. Although use of the constitutional standard impinges slightly on the discovery process, far more
important interests are served by the adoption of the stricter standard.
CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides for orders to protect against any abuse emanating from the liberal discovery process.
Specifically, rule 26(c) allows a person, upon good cause shown, to restrict either discovery itself or the disclosure of discovery.
Rule 26(c)'s good cause standard requires the moving party to
show that the harm resulting from either the discovery or its disclosure
outweighs the discoverer's need for either the discovery or its disclosure, depending upon the restriction sought. The good cause standard
is somewhat stricter when applied to restrictions on disclosure of discovery because of the first amendment interests involved, the difficulty
in ascertaining the potential harm from disclosure and the public interest in public litigation.
Restrictions are sought particularly on the disclosure of trade
secrets which generally encompass secret research, secret developments, and commercial information. The desire for these restrictions
most often arises in patent and antitrust litigation. Patent information
is granted more protection from disclosure than information concerning antitrust violations. This is because information of antitrust violations has a much higher value for informing the public than does
patent information.
Recently, the constitutionality of restrictions on disclosure of dis253. But see In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods., 81 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
where the trial court relied in part on Halkin to justify its denial of Upjohn's request for a protective order to prevent disclosure of information obtained through discovery. Upjohn involved
multi-district litigation and the defendant sought protection from disclosure to plaintiffs in independent state cases based on similar causes of action.
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covery has come into question. Prior to 1977, the courts applied rule
26(c)'s good cause standard to restrictions on disclosure of information
obtained through discovery, and the first amendment's "clear and present danger" standard, which requires a showing of a serious and imminent harm, was applied to restrictions on disclosure of information
obtained elsewhere. However, two recent cases hold that the strict first
amendment standard should be used to evaluate all restrictions on disclosure of information, regardless of the information's source or the
manner of its acquisition. This recent view has the blessings of the
United States Supreme Court which has decided that first amendment
rights do not depend on the source of the expression.
The use of the strict constitutional standard to evaluate restrictions
on disclosure of discovery is supported by logic and policy. Since the
use of the strict constitutional standard allows for consideration of the
value of the information for informing the public, disclosure of information vital to the public's welfare will be protected. Secret information which is valuable to its owner but not so valuable to the public's
welfare, such as trade secrets, will also remain protected. This consideration of the value of the information, when added to the public's interest in open litigation, mandates the application of the strict first
amendment standard to orders which restrict disclosure of discovery
information.
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